1. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40 (1977) . These jobs include work in the extraction and distribution of oil and gas as *el as related pipeline construction. Section 38A0.050(a) provided:
Applicability of chapter. (a) The provisions of this chapter apply to all employment which is a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the state is a party after July 7, 1972; however, the activity which generates the employment must take place inside the state and it must take place either on the property under the control of the person subject to this chapter or be directly related to activity taking place on the property under his control and the activity must be performed directly for the person subject to this chapter or his contractor or a subcontractor of his contractor or a supplier of his contractor or subcontractor.
["Person subject to this chapter" refers to an employer-lessee. "Property under his control" refers to property acquired by lease or right-of-way permit.] 2. ALASKA STAT. § 38A0.030(a) (1977), which established the hiring preference, provided: Resident employment. (a) In order to create, protect and preserve the right of Alaska residents to employment, the commissioner of natural resources shall incorporate into all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the state is a party, provisions requiring the lessee to comply with applicable laws and regulations with regard to the employment of Alaska residents, a provision requiring the employment of Alaska residents, a provisioh prohibiting discrimination against Alaska residents, and, when in the determination of the commissioner of natural resources it is practicable, a provision requiring compliance with the Alaska Plan, all in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 3. State Policy. It is the policy of the state in the development of its natural resources to seek and accomplish the development of its human resources by providing maximum employment opportunities for its residents in conjunction with natural resource management. ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.010 (1977).
4. Legislative findings. The legislature finds that Alaska has a uniquely high unemployment record among the states due both to cultural and geographical migration barriers which record has existed for many years and which experts have attested will persist without drastic governmental intervention. The legislature further finds that employment opportunities which from time to time occur in the areas of the state suffering from the largest chronic unemployment problem are nonrecurring and usually relate to the
I. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The privileges and immunitites clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that "[tihe Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 2 The provision is sometimes called the "interstate privileges and immunities clause,"' 3 since it serves to insure "a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." 14 , It should be distinguished from the equal protection clause, which prohibits state discrimination against "person[s] within its jurisdiction,"' 5 and the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause, 6 which purports to protect the privileges of national citizenship from state infringement. 7 The intended political function of the article IV clause was to "help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States."'" The early case history of the provision reflects a debate over whether promoting this function required each state to guarantee to noncitizens only those rights which, are "fundamental [and belong] to the citizens of all free governments" 9 or required them also to guarantee all rights granted to each state's own citizens. 20 For a long period 12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 14. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) . The Hicklin Court noted that "the terms 'citizen' and 'resident' are 'essentially interchangeable"' in this context. 98 S. Ct. 2487 n.8.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. See CuRR 475. The two clauses also differ with respect to their historical purpose, see text accompanying note 74 infra, and their standard of review, see text accompanying notes 75-81 infra.
16. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. The clause, however, has never operated to restrain any state legislation in its one hundred year history. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36 (1872). See also W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 13, at 520. But Sf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178, 182 (1941) , in which both Justices Douglas and Jackson in concurring opinions stated that the right to move freely from state to state is an incident of national citizenship. The interstate commerce clause, id at 160, and the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses, W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 13, at 520-21, have assumed the function of the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause.
Hereinafter, mention of "the privileges and immunities clause" refers to that of article IV. 18. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) . 19. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). These fundamental rights are similar to those known as "natural rights." See TRmE 405-07.
20. The literal language of the clause refers to "all privileges and immunities." The Articles . of Confederation version had a similar provision:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States .... [Vol. 1978 [Vol. :1069 following the 1868 Supreme Court decision in Paul v. Virginia 2 l the latter position prevailed. 22 Recently, however, the Court has attempted to revive the fundamental right versus ordinary right distinction. 23 The Hicklin plaintiffs asserted that Alaska's local hiring plan infringed upon their right to work, 24 a right which is "fundamental" under the privileges and immunities clause. 25 (1969) . 98 S. Ct. at 1860. He then read the portion of the Paul opinion quoted at note 22 supra to mean that the clause protected only "fundamental rights." 98 S. Ct. at 1862. Further impairing the Baldwin Court's interpretation of the clause is the fact that even though some precedent exists for limiting the clause's protection to "fundamental rights," see note 19 supra and accompanying text, considering it to apply only to those "basic and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union," marks a departure even from this authority. The fundamental rights of citizens are not necessarily equivalent to the privileges which bear upon the vitality of the nation as a whole.
DUKE L4WJOURAVAL
If the Baldwin Court's view of the scope of the privileges and immunities clause is valid, then the case's narrow holding that access by non-residents to a state's recreational big game hunting is not a privilege within the clause's purview seems proper. The fundamental versus ordinary right dichotomy, of course, also plays a central role in determining the degree of scrutiny with which a court will review legislation under the equal protection clause. The right to work, however, is not a fundamental one for these equal protection clause purposes. The Hicklin plaintiffs also alleged a violation of their right to interstate travel. Id at 162. This right is clearly a fundamental one, both as an historical matter under the privileges and the privileges and immunities clause has no application to the right to work when the desired employment relates to state disposition of its own property and, even assuming the clause is applicable, that the discrimination effected by Alaska Hire did not violate the clause under the appropriate standard of review. 26 A.
he McCready Exception.
Alaska's first argument has roots in the seminal case of Coifield v. Coryel 27 in which a Pennsylvanian challenged a New Jersey law limiting local commercial shellfishing to state fishermen. Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, held that despite any infringement of the fundamental privilege to work in any state, New Jersey could limit the right to fish from New Jersey waters to its own citizens. Justice Washington's argument rested on the theory that opening up the New Jersey shellfishery to foreign exploitation would exhaust the supply of shellfish available to New Jersey citizens. 2 Further, the legislature had the power to "regulate the use" of that resource for the benefit of the people of the state, since the fish were their "common property."
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McCready v. Virginia is a second landmark case dealing with natural resources and the privileges and immunities clause. In McCready, a nonresident challenged the state's denial of his right to plant shellfish. The plaintiff contended that the right to plant in Virginia waters-in contrast to the asserted right to extract in Co.Tfeld--did not involve any taking of state property. 31 Aside from its resting on an anachronistic ownership theory, the McCready exception to the privileges and immunities clause has a second major flaw. The McCready statute did not restrict shellfish to Virginians; nonresidents could purchase, but could not plant, Virginia shellfish. 4 9 Similarly, in Coifield nothing prevented Pennsylvanians from buying, as opposed to extracting, fish in New Jersey. 50 Thus, the common reading of McCready-that states can limit their natural resources to state uses 5 1-mischaracterizes the case. In Co 6eld and McCready, New Jersey and Virginia, respectively, in effect sought to preserve employment in the extracting and planting of shellfish for their citizens by closing their fisheries to nonresident fishermen.-2 It thus becomes evident that the "common property" basis of the McCready exception 53 is illusory. Regardless of whether fish and game can constitute the common property of the state, it is ludicrous to contend that a state can "own" employment in a given industry. Hence, when the restrictions in Coifleld and McCready are seen for what they are-attempts to limit employment to state citizens-it becomes apparent that they lack a justifying rationale.
Assuming arguendo that the McCready ownership rationale has
In dictum in a subsequent case, fellow Nixon appointees Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice
Burger also adopted a position more moderate than that of the Douglas majority-of which they were a part. Their view was that MeCready continued to supply a state with a "special interest," presumably one greater than the police power, in preferring its own citizens with respect to wild- 52. Approaching this interpretation is the Supreme Court's citation of McCready as representative of a "special-public-interest doctrine" that permits a state to "limit the right of noncitizens to exploit a State's natural resources." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 n.11 (1973 Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court had held that the state's ownership of oil and gas is "less of a legal fiction than it is with respect to fish and game." 565 P.2d at 168.
The objection to this view is that oil can be as much a migratory and thus nonpossessory resource as free-swimming fish, which, after 7'oomer, are accepted as being outside of McCread/s reach. See note 36 supra. That is, as the Supreme Court itself once held,
[p]etroleum gas and oil ... belong to the owner of the land, and are part of it, so long as they are on it or in it, or subject to his control, but when they escape and go into other land, or come under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1895). In fact, courts have often compared ownership of natural gas and oil to that of migratory wild animals. See, e.g., Westmoreland & C~imbria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889). Coal, which has a fixed situs, provides a better example of a mineral resource subject to possession and ownership.
In any case, under the holding of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928), Alaska presumably relinquishes any ownership interest in its oil and gas by putting these articles into interstate commerce. Foster-Fountain denied Louisiana the power under the commerce clause to require local processing of state-owned shrimp. The Supreme Court held that putting the shrimp into interstate commerce "put an end to the trust upon which the State is deemed to own or control the shrimp for the benefit of its people.' Id at 13. Cf. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530, 532 (1896) ("common ownership" of wild fish and game a valid basis for prohibiting their transportation out-of-state).
58. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 172-73 (Boochever, C.L, dissenting in part). For mention of the probable interstate commerce clause consequences had Alaska attempted to restrict its oil and gas for state use, see id at 172 n.5; note 127 infra.
the "common property" of the state, 5 9 it is difficult to justify the McCready exception as applied to barriers to nonresident employment.
One response is that Alaska's local hiring plan "deals with" 60 or, in CoTfeld terms, "regulates the use of" 61 state-owned oil and gas. The purported link between employment and the resource is the requirement in the Alaska Hire statute that the work-generating activity take place on or be directly related to property acquired under state oil and gas leases. 62 Clearly, this link has some importance. Were Alaska to extend local hiring to all private employment in the state, such a statute plainly would exceed the scope of the resource-related McCready exception and thus would be subject to review under the privileges and immunities clause. Following the analysis presented below, the statute would fall. 63 On the other hand, neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the equal protection clause prevents a state from preferring its own residents for public employment; 6a the McCready exception is not needed to save such a preference.
Because of the link to state-owned resources, Alaska Hire falls in between these two extremes. The Supreme Court in Hicklin found the connection between Alaska-owned oil and the employment covered under Alaska Hire "sufficiently attenuated" so as to prevent that connection from supplying a basis for discrimination against nonresidents. 65 Indeed, Justice Brennan characterized the Act as "an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of Alaska's decision to develop her oil and gas resources to bias their employment practices in favor of the State's residents. '6 6 Certainly this interpretation makes it difficult to visualize the state as "dealing with" or "restricting the use of" its common property. In any event, even if under an extant McCready doctrine an "attenuated" link to state-owned resources could insulate nonresident employment discrimination from privileges and immunities clause objections, the interstate commerce clause might not permit such discrimination. 67 
B. Application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to Alaska
Hire.
Assuming that the McCready doctrine does not provide Alaska Hire with an exception to privileges and immunities clause review, the question becomes whether the clause itself tolerates the discrimination effected by Alaska's domicile hiring preference. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.
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At least one commentator has interpreted the Toomer test as invoking one of the two standards of review--"strict scrutiny" or "rational basis"-employed in equal protection clause cases, the applicable standard depending upon the facts in each case. 70 71. These cases, however, differ from Hicklin in two respects. In one group of cases the plaintiffs originally challenged durational residency requirements. Although the plaintiffs had not been state residents long enough to satisfy these waiting periods, they had at least moved into, and were most likely domiciled in, the defendant state. Thus, the equal protection clause, which prohibits a state from discriminating against persons "within its jurisdiction," constituted the appropriate provision for purposes of judicial review. After invalidating the waiting periods, the Yet the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses serve distinct purposes. The equal protection clause prohibits state discrimination against persons "within its jurisdiction;" 72 the privileges and immunities clause proscribes discrimination against out-ofstaters. 73 In addition, the equal protection clause has historically served to curb official racial prejudice, while the privileges and immunities clause has functioned to smooth economic relations among the states. 74 Thus, the better view is that judicial analysis under the two clauses should not be equated automatically. 75 First, the Toomer test does not inquire into the nature of any classifications created or rights restricted by the contested statute as does the two-tiered equal protection (and due process) system of review. 76 The classic privileges and immunities clause test stated in Toomer is unitary-regardless of the class or right allegedly harmed, the applicable standard remains one of permitting state discrimination only when it bears a "close relation" to a "substantial reason" for discriminating. 77 Second, the degree of judicial deference that must be accorded a statute challenged under the privileges and immunities clause places the Toomer test in between the two The Hicklin plaintiffs raised both privileges and immunities and equal protection claims, but the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the latter. 98 S. Ct 76. Under the equal protection clause, reviewing courts will apply "strict scrutiny" to a statute which allegedly discriminates against a "suspect" class or which impairs a "fundamental"
right. In the absence of such allegations, courts will examine the statute under the more deferen- standards of review used under the equal protection clause. Toomer's requirement of a "substantial" or "valid" reason for state discrimination falls short of the "compelling" justification necessary under strict equal protection clause scrutiny. 78 On the other hand, Toomer's literal insistence upon a "close relation"--and, interpretatively, its requirement of the least possible disparity 7 9 -between the purpose and effect of the discrimination is more stringent than the corresponding demand of the relaxed form of equal protection review that the statute bear only an "arguably rational" relation to the asserted governmental interest. 8 In Craig the Supreme Court found violative of the equal protection clause an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to females under the age of 18 and males under age 21. The standard applied was that an allegedly gender-discriminating statute must bear a "substantial relation" to an "important" state objective. 429 U.S. at 197. Compared to the second half of this requirement, the Toomer test seems no more stringent, especially if one borrows the "valid [meaning, presumably, 'permissible'] reason" as opposed to the "substantial reason" language from Toomer. On the other hand, to the extent that Toomer's "close relation" terminology means that the state must use the least restrictive alternative to promote its objective, see text accompanying note 79 supra, the Toomer standard seems more demanding than intermediate scrutiny's "substantial relation" requirement.
For criticism of the multi-tiered equal protection clause approach that Craig sanctions, see 429 U.S. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring); id at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 217, 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Professor The more difficult question is whether the means employed by Alaska Hire bear a "close relation" to its objectives. Since under local hiring jobs go first to bona fide Alaskans, the statute would seem to relate rationally to upgrading human resources and reducing unemployment. However, it has already been shown that the "close relation" test demands not only an "arguably rational" relation but also, quite probably, use of the least discriminatory plan available. 93 Under this standard Alaska Hire runs afoul of the privileges and immunities clause. The program proves to be an overly restrictive attempt to lower unemployment in that it occasionally discriminates against out-of-staters for the sake of preferring employed residents. 94 As Justice Brennan noted, "[a] highly skilled and educated resident who has never been unemployed is entitled to precisely the same preferential treatment as the unskilled, habitually unemployed Arctic Eskimo enrolled in a job training program."" Alaska could more directly ameliorate its unemployment problem by limiting its hiring preference to unemployed Alaskans. 9 6 Although the Supreme Court questioned the permissibility even of this type of preference, 97 the modification would reduce the current discrimination against nonresidents by elevating them to an equal status (albeit behind that of unemployed Alaskans) with employed residents for jobs covered by the Act. An additional approach to attacking unemployment directly-one that Alaska in fact has adopted-would be to provide job training for unskilled, unemployed Alaskans. 98 Manpower programs could include preparation for oil-and gas-related work. Presumably, the state P.2d at 169. Considering such an attempt a valid state pursuit under the privileges and immunities clause, the trial court upheld the Act. Id at 169. See note 9 sufpra. The Alaska Supreme Court also ignored the plain wording of the Act and deemed the purpose of the legislation the impermissible one of "economic protectionism." Nevertheless, it preserved the statute on the basis of the McCready exception. 565 P.2d at 169. The United States Supreme Court accepted the purpose of the Act as the reduction of unemployment, 98 S. Ct Reliance on an unemployed-resident hiring preference that extends to those Alaskans who, because of their social circumstances, require special training to become job-competitive, represents both a narrowly tailored and an effective approach to the reduction of unem- Since Alaska Hire's domicile preference does not create suspect classifications nor impair fundamental rights, its equal protection clause review would take place under the more deferential standard. That test is whether the challenged statute bears an arguably rational relation to a legitimate state interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 305 (1976). That Alaska Hire promotes permissible government objectives in a "rational" manner has already been noted. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
Professor Tribe has observed that, in general, nondurational residency requirements will violate the privileges and immunities clause under the Toomer test but will satisfy the rational basis standard of the equal protection clause. TRIBE 411-12.
102. As noted at note 91 supra, the Court ostensibly assumed that Alaska Hire satisfied an initial Toomer test of promoting a substantial state interest. mined, did not constitute a "peculiar source of the evil"-unemployment-at which the statute was aimed. 0 3 Rather, the Court found the major cause of Alaska's high unemployment to be the remoteness of many residents, particularly Eskimos and Indians, from educational, employment, and job training opportunities."° Without questioning this factual observation, the use of the "peculiar source of the evil" test to probe further into the nexus between legislative ends and means must nevertheless be noted. 0 5 Hicklin apparently marks a departure from the more general, single-step inquiry into the tailoring of means and ends of Doe and lower court cases.' 0 6 II. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE Independent of its link to resources which may be owned by the state or of its status under the privileges and immunities clause, a domicile employment preference may conflict with the negative implications of the interstate commerce clause.' 07 "Negative implications" refers to the fact that the commerce clause not only grants Congress plenary power to control interstate commerce' 08 but also forbids states from placing "undue" or "discriminatory" burdens on that commerce. 1 0 9
In determining what constitutes an undue burden on commerce, the Supreme Court has looked either to the directness of a statute's effects on interstate commerce or to whether those effects outweigh local interests.10 The most recent Supreme Court standard, announced in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,"' stresses a balancing approach:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene- will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 12 Under this formulation, the threshold inquiry is whether a challenged statute regulates or otherwise burdens interstate commerce.'1 3 Residential preferences can violate the interstate commerce clause by restricting the interstate movement of natural resources or of labor. The natural resource issue arose in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia." t4 In that case the Supreme Court held it an impermissible interference with commerce for West Virginia to require its gas producers to accord West Virginia consumers first right of purchase. The basis of the decision was that the local preference withdrew large quantities of the resource from interstate markets. 115 The Court in Edwards .v. California" 16 confirmed that the movement of persons is "commerce" under the interstate commerce clause." 7 At least one case, Brown v. Anderson,"' subsequently applied this holding to restrictions on the interstate flow of labor. The Brown court invalidated a domicile requirement for the use of certain Alaskan salmon fisheries on the grounds that the statute restricted the movement in commerce of nonresident fishermen.119
Once a burden on commerce is shown to exist, the question becomes whether the importance of local interests makes that burden constitutionally tolerable.' 20 An attempt by a state to advance its own economic interest is generally insufficient to override constitutional objections.' 2 1 Thus, in Pike, where the state's sole interest was the "tenuous" one of enhancing the reputation of its cantaloupes to increase their market demand, the Supreme Court found impermissible a re-112. Id at 142.
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. See id at 140-42. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that contaminated or unfit produce is not within the protection of the commerce clause. Id at 143-44. Yet it recently found that solid and liquid waste does not constitute such a "quarantine" item. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531 Ct. , 2538 Ct. (1978 thereto. 128 The total coverage of local hire in 1976 amounted to six percent of the labor force of the country's least populous state.
129 Further, one-quarter of the covered employment actually went to nonresidents, illustrating that the statute perfers, but does not require, Alaskan citizenship.1 30 It might be further argued that the domicile status that the Act prefers is available to anyone willing to establish it. However, establishing domicile is not burden-free. The migrant must forfeit the benefits of citizenship in his former state. 131 Further, he must manifest his intent to make Alaska his permanent residence ' 32 -often an unrealistic requirement given the short-term, "boom-like" nature of many of the projects covered by Alaska Hire.
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The domicile preference may thus restrict the flow of labor to Alaska. To the extent the workers deterred by Alaska Hire represent the most qualified labor for the available positions, the preference interferes with the maximization of productivity in the nationally important Alaskan oil industry. This result might, in turn, discourage investment in the industry. In short, as a result of the obstacles it poses to the free movement of labor, Alaska Hire "does affect and burden interstate commerce."'
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The issue thus devolves into whether local interests outweigh this burden.
3 5 Alaska's justification for local hire-securing employment for its people-looms as a substantial one under the commerce clause. 36 Yet under the Pike test 37 a countervailing factor exists in Alaska's ability to promote this goal by the alternative means of providing manpower programs and limiting its hiring preference to unemployed Alaskans. These alternatives appear to place less of a burden on commerce in that out-of-state workers would not have to become Alaskan domiciles to qualify for the same hiring priority as employed Whether the burdens on commerce outweigh the local interests involved in Alaska Hire is, to be sure, not subject to precise determination. However, the commerce clause holding of Toomer proves helpful by analogy. A provision of the statute in question 3 9 required that owners of shrimping boats fishing off the South Carolina coast pack their catch in that state. The Supreme Court held that despite South Carolina's substantial interest in promoting local employment, the likelihood that packing operations could be performed more efficiently elsewhere placed an undue burden on commerce. 140 An appealing argument thus can be made' 4 ' that, despite Alaska's interest in reducing unemployment, the free movement of labor, if jeopardized by Alaska Hire, deserves just as much commerce clause protection as the movement of business operations in Toomer or, for that matter, the flow of inanimate resources in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.
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III. DIMENSIONS OF STATE LEASING POWER
The Supreme Court in 1940 suggested that, "[1like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power • . . to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases. These statements indicate that the basis of the special public interest doctrine rests on the fact that the government uses money over which it has a proprietary interest.' 49 The argument continues that the government, like a private contracting party, should enjoy complete freedom in spending its own funds.
In applying this line of reasoning to justify Alaska Hire, the state of Alaska substituted state oil leases for the government construction contracts in Helm and Crane. 50 It then maintained that it could affix such conditions as it pleased-including first-hired, last-fired preferences for Alaskans-to these leases.1 5 1 Since the oil companies were free to reject the leases and seek oil elsewhere, Alaska Hire might be seen as merely a valid, noncoercive exercise of the state's capacity to act as a private lessor, free from constitutional restraints.1 of state action. 61 A state should no more be allowed to impair constitutional rights through a lease than through direct regulation. The mere fact that it was through its leasing power that Alaska infringed the privileges and immunities and interstate commerce clauses does not save the Alaska Hire Act from its constitutional infirmities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The nondurational residence preference of Alaska Hire had two constitutional failings. First, it violated the privileges and immunities clause. That clause applies because the McCready exception, based upon the anachronism of considering common ownership of resources a basis for preferential treatment of state residents, has lost its validity. Alaska Hire offended the clause by unnecessarily distinguishing between nonresidents and employed residents in an attempt to reduce local unemployment. Second, the Act created an undue burden on interstate commerce, thus running afoul of the commerce clause. Its domicile requirement, especially when weighed against the express goal of reducing unemployment, placed too significant an impediment on the free flow of labor. The fact that the state's function in the local hiring plan was that of lessor could not have insulated the program from these constitutional defects. Alaska Hire also threatened to open up a Pandora's box of state restrictions on the employment of nonresidents.1 62 Although some such restrictions may be unobjectionable, such as bona fide residence requirements for state or municipal employment, 63 serious objections arise when a domicile preference expands into the private sector. The Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court, for example, raised the spectre of an extension of local hiring to leases of state dairy, agricultural, mining and lumber lands." 6 Assuming the goal of such a sizeable extension to be the reduction of local unemployment, the Toomer privileges and immunities clause test would raise strong objections to the unnecessary relegation of nonresidents to last in hiring priority. 162. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 173 (Boochever, Ci., dissenting in part). 163. See cases cited at note 64 supra. Unlike the domicile preference of Alaska Hire, most of these requirements have undergone review only for minimum rationality under the equal protection clause. See note 71 and accompanying text sulpra. Further, the governments involved have managed to offer objectives, such as employee loyalty and recovery of training costs, that make bona fide residency a criterion more tailored to their achievement than is residency with respect to reducing unemployment. For a compendium of cases see Alleyne, supra note 38, at 10 n.46.
164. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 173 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part).
Moreover, the inhibition of movement of qualified out-of-state labor into these key industries might significantly affect interstate commerce.
The most extreme use of local hiring by a state would consist of its implementation in all private enterprise through direct regulation. Of course, with the demise of the McCready and Heim-Crane doctrines, the absence in such a program of any link to natural resources or to a governmental lease actually has little bearing on its constitutionality.
Rather, the barriers to such pervasive regulation lie in more pronounced versions of the same constitutional objections that would arise when the hiring preference is confined to government-leased industries. 165 The most intimidating scenario is the possibility of all states enacting employment preferences.' 66 One might presume that more nonresidents who travel to Alaska for work are disposed to become domiciled in their workplace than are New Jersey and Connecticut commuters who work in New York City.' 67 Thus, a "New York resident hire law" unrelated to the special local interests governing public employment 168 might impose considerable burdens on the interstate flow of labor. 169 Moreover, as states created obstacles to immigration in efforts to reduce unemployment among their own residents, the effect might be merely to create unemployment problems in nearby states. The end result might be a retaliatory use of local hiring preferences, producing a "Balkanization of interstate commercial activity"' 7 0 in which "each state would become a separate and isolated enclave."'' Although Alaska Hire had not produced these drastic consequences as of 1978, a compelling policy basis existed for the Supreme 165. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. 166. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 173-74 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting in part). Prior to Hicklin at least 18 states had resident hire laws applicable to private contractors on public construction or procurement activities. Brief of Appellees, supra note 26, at 8 n.4. Certainly, the fact that the funds involved are in a sense "owned" by the government would no more save these laws than did the parallel Heim-Crane notion in Hicklin that as a lessor the state can act freely. See text accompanying notes 150-60 supra. Also, unlike the case of public employment, see note 163 supra, it would seem difficult for a state to assert that the close nexus between domicile and employee loyalty is relevant to public works employees. Finally, as a means of reducing unemployment, public works laws that require the hiring of residents would be subject to the same means-ends objections as Alaska Hire. But see People ex rel Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 Il. 2d 258, 273, 335 N.E.2d 469, 478-79 (1975) (preference for Illinois laborers on public works projects bears a "close relation" to goal of providing employment for residents). Thus, Hicklin would appear to have made these laws constitutionally suspect.
167. But see text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
168. See note 163 supra. 169. For a discussion of the equal protection clause fate of New York's preference for "citizens" in public works hiring, see text accompanying notes 144-46, 153-58 supra.
170. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977) . 171. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 174 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part).
